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Preface
The Geological Repository Safeguards Experts Group (Member State Support Programme
tasks JNT/C1204 and C1226), agreed that annual meetings should be held to address
interface issues between IAEA safeguards and radioactive waste management and to
explore the use of safety and operational information to make International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards more effective and efficient for geological repository
facilities. It has also been recognised that the safeguards measures for geological reposi-
tories are to be developed site-specifically.  To address these issues to the planned Olkiluo-
to repository in Finland a meeting of experts in safety, geological repository operations,
and safeguards from 6 States, European Commission, and IAEA was held in Olkiluoto and
Rauma, Finland, during September 29 – October 4, 2003.
The pre-operational phase of the Olkiluoto repository should be efficiently used by the
parties involved in safeguards. The applicability and reliability of the potential new
techniques and the efficient practices must be developed and proven before their imple-
mentation as safeguards measures to be applied at the subsequent stages of the repository
development. The visit to the location of the proposed Olkiluoto repository and neighbour-
ing areas and subsequent presentations enabled the working groups to discuss the various
issues with reference to actual site conditions. The working groups were thus able to
identify potential measurement and monitoring techniques and research and development
requirements for consideration by the Finnish authorities, in addition to making recom-
mendations to the IAEA on planned activities for carrying out before and during the early
investigation phase of the proposed Olkiluoto repository. It was understood that all parties
shall take good care of the implementation of the planned activities to ensure that proven
means, approaches and the required verified information is at hand at the time the pro-
jected facility will become a nuclear facility under construction. The working groups
reports are presented in the Annexes of this report as discussed at Rauma and edited
afterwards. The content of this report reflects the professional competence of the partici-
pants. The Executive summary was generated at the meeting. The drafting of the report
was carried out mainly by Mr. Bruce Moran and Ian Upshall (Baseline requirements and
knowledge-base development, Annex 3) and Tapani Honkamaa (Nuclear Material Charac-
terization, Annex 4). This report was compiled finally by Mr. Juha Rautjärvi and Olli Okko
according to the comments received from all of the participants.
OKKO Olli (ed.). Establishment of IAEA knowledge of integrity of the geological repository boundaries
and disposed spent fuel assemblies in the context of the Finnish geological repository. Experts’ Group
meeting Report on Task JNT/C 1204 of the Member States’ Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards.
STUK-YTO-TR 207. Helsinki 2004. 14 pp. + Annexes 15 pp.
Keywords: safeguards, spent fuel, geological repository
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1 Executive summary1.1 Issues
A geological repository is a unique facility type
from the perspective of international safeguards
because of its construction in suitable geological
formations, the long construction period, and the
continuing safeguards requirement after facility
closure. Because of these, the International Atom-
ic Energy Agency (IAEA) should recognize that
different design information verification time
schedules apply than have typically been used
when applying safeguards to surface facilities.
These extended time frames apply not only follow-
ing closure of the facility, but to the design, charac-
terization, and construction phases. If the IAEA is
to effectively and efficiently develop assurance of
the integrity of the perimeter of the geological re-
pository, the most advantageous way would be ear-
ly IAEA interactions with the repository operator,
the State, and, where relevant, Regional Authority
to generate and evaluate design information be-
fore excavations at the proposed repository loca-
tion begin. The IAEA safeguards policy statement
relevant to geological repositories recommends
that design information verification activities be-
gin during this early phase.
Although the proposed repository location does
not meet the definition of a nuclear facility until it
receives nuclear material and does not meet the
definition of being under construction until the
location is qualified and licensed by the State,
excavation of safeguards-relevant shafts, ramps,
and tunnels begins when excavation into the bed-
rock is initiated. Although the generic safeguards
approach for geological repositories has been gen-
erally accepted, the safeguards measures and pro-
cedures have not been applied to or tested under
site-specific conditions. Finland’s proposed
Olkiluoto geological repository presents the first
site-specific case at which the safeguards approach
will be applied. Therefore, the site-specific proce-dures and measures need to be carefully devel-
oped and tested. Substantial baseline data regard-
ing the integrity of the host bedrock has been
collected by the operator providing a basis for the
creation of the initial knowledge base. As the
ability to independently verify the baseline infor-
mation will be lost when the excavation opera-
tions begin, IAEA activities must be initiated
soon.
In order to facilitate the IAEA meeting its
safeguards goals at Finland’s Olkiluoto geological
repository, design information verification activi-
ties should begin immediately and testing of meas-
ures to maintain knowledge of the integrity of the
geological repository boundary should begin very
soon. The early evaluations will determine where
the gaps are in the provided design information
and verification capabilities, and allow these gaps
to be closed. Effective safeguards will require a
long-term commitment from the IAEA, albeit at
low effort levels, for the continual verification of
design information at the geological repository.
1.2 Recommendations
The experts recommend the following:
1. Finland should immediately notify the IAEA of
the status of the geological repository and pro-
vide to the IAEA safeguards-relevant informa-
tion on the geological environment and integri-
ty of the bedrock, on neighbouring locations
and activities, and on the proposed design of
the exploratory tunnel and geologic repository.
2. Finland, Posiva (the repository developer and
operator), Euratom, and IAEA should initiate
interactions and planning for IAEA safeguards
activities. We note that Euratom has main-
tained a low-level involvement at meetings
related to geological repositories and that six
IAEA staff attended the Geological Repository
Safeguards Experts Meeting.5
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awareness and support for IAEA safeguards
interactions and safeguards-relevant activities
at the proposed Olkiluoto geological repository
site.
4. The IAEA should develop its competencies to
be able to evaluate information provided by
Finland related to the geological repository, to
determine gaps in the information, and to inde-
pendently verify the accuracy of the informa-
tion. These competencies could be quickly es-
tablished through cost free experts and con-
sultants.
5. The IAEA should initiate new or extend exist-
ing tasks to confirm the ability of satellite
imaging, geophysical monitoring, and environ-
mental radiological sampling to generate
knowledge base of the proposed site and to be
able to maintain that knowledge base.66. Following iterative interactions with Finland,
the IAEA should identify what information is
safeguards relevant information to establish-
ing knowledge of the integrity of the geological
repository perimeter and document procedures
and guidance to be used for future interactions.
7. The Member State Support Programs should
provide expertise to the IAEA and should un-
dertake technical tasks to develop, test and
validate the verification methods.
8. The IAEA member states’ support programmes
should to the extent possible provide assistance
to the IAEA’s geological repository safeguards
activities in the following areas:
• Funding
• Equipment
• Expertise
• Human resources.
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2 Background2.1 Geological repository safeguards
overview
In comparison to above-ground facilities, at which
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
has experience verifying design information and
implementing safeguards monitoring and verifica-
tion measures, geological repository safeguards
present unique challenges. First, the space, into
which the repository will be constructed and the
underground areas contiguous to the boundaries
of the repository, cannot be directly observed. Sec-
ond, once emplaced, the IAEA will no longer be
able to reverify the inventory of nuclear material
contained in the repository because of the backfill-
ing of the emplacement drifts. Thus, should conti-
nuity of knowledge of the nuclear material content
of the repository be lost, that knowledge cannot be
restored.
2.1.1 IAEA safeguards policy
International Atomic Energy Agency, Policy Series
Number 15, dated June 1997, states the following
policies, among others, with respect to geological
repository safeguards:
“3.1.1 Spent fuel disposed in geological repositor-
ies is subject to safeguards in accordance with
the applicable safeguards requirements. Safe-
guards for such material are maintained after
the repository has been back-filled and sealed,
and for as long as the safeguards agreement
remains in force. The safeguards applied should
provide a credible assurance of non-diversion.”
“3.1.2 The safeguards system for such a reposi-
tory should be based on: verification of design
information during design, construction, and
operation; verification of receipts and flow that
no nuclear material is removed by any declared
or undeclared access routes; and maintenanceof continuity of knowledge on the nuclear ma-
terial content.”
“3.1.4 Safeguards requirements should be inte-
grated into the repository design at an early
stage in order to establish functional, non-
intrusive, and cost-effective safeguards meas-
ures. Consultations between the State and the
IAEA should, therefore, start at an early stage
to agree on the safeguards measures in
the repository.”
“3.1.7 The State should provide the following
information as early as possible:
• draft plans of a geological repository site;
• description of intended exploratory under-
ground works for the geological repository;
• information on existing local mines; and
• any other information that might be iden-
tified by the IAEA as relevant for the
purpose of safeguards.
“3.3.1.2 The Agency, in collaboration with the
State, should establish all pertinent informa-
tion about the original undisturbed site (i.e.,
zero-point checking), preferably before excava-
tion begins, in order to plan for safeguards
measures.”
2.1.2 IAEA safeguards approach development
In 1988, the IAEA held its first Advisory Group
meeting to address safeguards for the final dispos-
al of spent fuel in geological repositories. The
IAEA’s Programme for the Development of Safe-
guards Approaches for the Final Disposal of Spent
Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR) was be-
gun in 1994 and, in 1998, provided recommenda-
tions to the IAEA on generic safeguards approach-
es for spent fuel conditioning facilities and for op-
erating and closed geological repositories. Nine7
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tions contributed to the SAGOR Programme rec-
ommendations. In 1999¹, the IAEA established the
Geological Repository Safeguards Experts Group
to provide advice on safeguards technology devel-
opment for geological repositories and on imple-
menting the generic safeguards approach at spe-
cific facilities.
In a number of meetings this experts’ group,
named at Rauma ASTOR (Application of Safe-
guards TO Repositories) discussed specific topics:
the use of geophysical techniques, the definition
and establishment of baseline knowledge, and the
interface between safeguards and safety monitor-
ing activities during the construction and opera-
tion of a repository. All of the meetings arrived at
the same conclusions. Namely that the final set of
safeguards measures must be developed and de-
fined for specific repository projects and that ge-
neric discussions should now be replaced with
site-specific considerations. That is why this ex-
perts’ meeting was held; i.e., to discuss site-specif-
ic needs for the Olkiluoto geological repository.
2.1.3 Meeting structure and objectives
The objective of the experts’ group meeting was to
identify what knowledge the IAEA should estab-
lish during the pre-operational phase of the
Olkiluoto geological repository to have assurance
of the integrity of the geological repository bound-
aries and spent fuel assemblies and to determine
what activities are recommended to the IAEA for
acquisition of that knowledge. A second objective
was to ensure that the required knowledge base
will exist when a repository begins nuclear mate-
rial disposal operations. Through evaluating the
knowledge and information base against the Fin-
land-specific situation, actions will be identified8
1 The 1st Experts Group Meeting took place in Helsinki duringthat should be undertaken by the IAEA, Finland
and Euratom, and the Member State Support Pro-
grams.
Numerous presentations were made with the
objective of stimulating further discussion by the
experts. The meeting agenda (Annex 1) lists the
presentations made. Working Groups were formed
by the participants to examine some specific is-
sues related to site characterisation and the estab-
lishment of a knowledge base and the characteri-
sation of spent fuel. All issues discussed were
directly related to the proposed Olkiluoto facility.
During the meeting, experts from the Finnish,
Swedish, German, Canadian, UK, US, Euratom
and IAEA delegations discussed the use of radio-
metric measurements, satellite imagery and geo-
physical technologies and their potential in sup-
port of site evaluation characterization pro-
grammes. Safeguards and information manage-
ment experts separately considered two related
topics; the production of Olkiluoto site baseline
information and the broader data and information
requirements for a knowledge-based system. In
order to better understand the features of the
undisturbed site, a visit to the location of the
proposed Olkiluoto repository and neighbouring
areas was undertaken on the first morning of the
meeting. The visit and subsequent presentations
enabled the working groups to discuss the various
issues with reference to actual site conditions. The
working groups were thus able to identify poten-
tial measurement and monitoring techniques and
research and development requirements for con-
sideration by the Finnish authorities, in addition
to making recommendations to the IAEA on
planned activities for carrying out before and
during the early investigation phase of the pro-
posed Olkiluoto repository. October 19–21, 1999.
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 7
3 Baseline3.1 Definition
Baseline information is that information which,
when evaluated, can be used to create a knowl-
edge base of the site features and characteristics
against which changes can be identified, analysed
and compared.
The same set of information can be used for
different purposes, to establish different subordi-
nate baselines, depending on the data used to
create the information. For example, geophysical
data collected by the repository developer may be
used to establish a knowledge base on the geologi-
cal medium to provide assurance that suitable
containment will be provided for certain radionu-
clides over a specific length of time. These same
data could also be used by the IAEA to establish
an understanding of the integrity of the geological
repository boundary.
3.2 Establishment of knowledge base
for the repository – Annex 3
The Finnish project represents an opportunity for
the IAEA to follow the State investigation and
construction of the repository from almost undis-
turbed conditions up to the arrival of the first
nuclear material items, to establish sufficient
knowledge about the characteristics of the site,
and to develop and test the safeguards approach
necessary to ensure IAEA goal attainment.
From 1989 to the present, numerous investiga-
tions have been performed by the operator TVO,
and later by Posiva, the company entrusted with
the investigation and design of the national repos-
itory, and its contractors. The purpose of these
investigations has been to establish a knowledge
base of information on which a judgment could be
reached on the suitability of the bedrock for radio-
nuclide containment and environmental protec-
tion. The investigations focused on numerous are-
as such as hydrology, rock dynamics, and climate,vegetation, fauna, seismic and social factors. This
work, which was supported in part by the use of
approximately 25 boreholes in the vicinity of the
proposed repository, will be further enhanced fol-
lowing the construction of an underground rock
characterisation facility (Onkalo) comprising a
ramp, a ventilation shaft and drifts reaching a
depth of approximately 500 m. Construction of
this facility will start in mid-2004.
Construction of a fifth Finnish nuclear power
reactor at the neighbouring Olkiluoto site may
start as early as 2005 lasting about seven years.
Consequently, there exists only a relatively short
time window for the IAEA to establish techniques
and to study the resultant data under relatively
undisturbed site conditions. This challenging
timescale was recognised by the working group
and as a result, it attempted to identify those
activities which the IAEA should be encouraged to
carry out to establish a knowledge base that may
support the realization of specific IAEA safeguards
goals (IAEA 1997, 2003).
The definition of baseline data in relation to
safeguards was discussed together with the moni-
toring and measuring techniques necessary to
generate the required data for the establishment
and maintenance of a knowledge base. The results
of the discussion are summarized below with some
detailed issues presented in Annex 3.
In particular the following subjects were ad-
dressed:
1. the use of data acquired since 1989 including
environmental, geological, and satellite infor-
mation;
2. the selection and follow up of safeguards rele-
vant data during the construction of Onkalo;
3. the development and testing of specific safe-
guards instrumentation during the early inves-
tigation phase.9
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assemblies – Annex 4
Nuclear materials characterization is a R&D pri-
ority and is likely to provide a source of baseline
data of primary importance. Information leading
to improved knowledge about the properties of
spent fuel items should therefore be derived be-
fore they are designated for underground disposal.
Bearing in mind the currently proposed timescale,
the fifteen year period between now and the re-
ceipt of the first spent fuel assembly at the10Olkiluoto disposal facility does not allow a great
deal of time to develop and implement advanced
characterization methods. It is noted that some
nuclear material characterization methods and
processes may influence facility design decisions.
This specific issue was taken on the agenda in this
meeting. Summary of discussions held in a work-
ing group B “Requirements for nuclear material
characterization for final disposal” are presented
in Annex 4.
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4 Olkiluoto geological repository4.1 Olkiluoto issues
In 1983, Finland began site investigations rele-
vant to the candidate geological repository at
Olkiluoto. Following the detailed site investiga-
tions at six candidate sites in 1992 – 1998, the
Olkiluoto site was accepted to represent typical
Finnish bedrock and was proposed to be the suita-
ble site for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. In
May 2001, the Finnish Parliament endorsed the
Decision-in-Principle to construct a geological re-
pository at Olkiluoto. Construction of the reposi-
tory is conditional on the results of site characteri-
zation. In May 2004, construction of the Onkalo
exploratory underground rock characterization fa-
cility will begin at the repository location to pro-
vide data for the site characterization. In 2012, if
the location is determined to be acceptable, the
license application for the construction of the re-
pository will be issued. After the construction li-
cense has been granted, construction of tunnels
and drifts for the final disposal can be continued.
Spent fuel emplacement operations are scheduled
to begin in 2020. At present, emplacement is ex-
pected to continue for 90 years.
Until the construction of the Onkalo explorato-
ry facility is initiated, the geological location re-
mains undisturbed except for the boreholes used
for initial site characterization. Coordination
meetings between Finland, Euratom, and IAEA
were initiated in 1999 to begin discussion of what
information the IAEA should assess and what
activities IAEA should perform to apply effective
safeguards to the geological repository. The bene-
fits of the early Finland-IAEA cooperation are to
ensure that information that is required on the
undisturbed repository site is collected before ex-
cavation of the Onkalo exploratory underground
facility begins in 2004.2  The concept ‘Site’ used hereby refers to the geological conditi4.2 Site² description – ONKALO and
Olkiluoto geological repository
The Onkalo underground rock characterisation fa-
cility and the planned Olkiluoto geological reposi-
tory are located in Eurajoki near, and on the same
island as, the Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant. Also
located nearby, are the Olkiluoto NPP low-level
and intermediate level waste repository rock cav-
ern. These underground constructions are located
in old Precambrian bedrock consisting mainly of
deformed mica gneiss. Similar bedrock conditions
are reported also from the site characterisation
studies for Onkalo. Therefore, the experience of
applying drilling and blasting techniques with re-
inforcement methods can be applied also for Onka-
lo and the safeguards approach adapted to this
procedure. The island is also under review for con-
struction of another nuclear power reactor and the
spent fuel encapsulation plant. In addition to the
human induced activity there is natural activity
(e.g. rock quarry, waves striking the shore, ice
breaking, etc.) that could affect the implementa-
tion in a conclusive manner of the required safe-
guards measures.
4.3 State obligations to report/provide
information
It is not intended that the Onkalo exploratory fa-
cility is to be licensed as a nuclear facility. Howev-
er, once the geological characterization phase is
complete, and assuming that the results are satis-
factory, ramps and tunnels of the Onkalo will be-
come components of a licensed disposal facility. At
present, the proposed excavation is licensed ac-
cording to Posiva’s application referring to the civ-
il construction legislation (not even mining legis-
lation) by the municipality. Therefore, the report-
ing towards the State is based on voluntary deliv-11
ons, not to the Additional Protocol.
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dations given by the State authorities. The aim of
these efforts is to secure conditions for safe and
safeguardable disposal of spent nuclear fuel.
4.4 Finland–IAEA Information
exchange/coordination
Timely and good communication is essential, and
the desired coordination of activities can be ex-
pected to happen. The information requirements
are determined by the needs of the involved par-
ties. First of all, the parties to be involved should
identify themselves. Certainly these include the
producers of the Finnish spent nuclear fuel, the
repository development and implementing compa-
ny, and the responsible authorities, in Finland, at
the IAEA, and probably also at the Euratom.-
What does any particular party need to know, and
why?
The law, treaties and agreements, as negotiat-
ed, will identify the parties and their respective
rights and obligations. The safeguards regime and,
particularly, the system implementation will call
for clear roles and functional responsibilities so as
to ensure efficient performance.
It is evident that due to the nature of the
undertaking there are information needs to ena-
ble efficient implementation of particular safe-
guards measures in order to build and document
the assurances of the absence of any safeguards
relevant undeclared excavations at the Onkalo
exploratory underground tunnels.
Further to this, there are information needs
associated with tasks that must be initiated to
develop required reliable technique, procedures
and practices as well as to obtain prove of the
usefulness and the reliability of any existing ones.
Additional information requirements are asso-
ciated with the activities aimed at obtaining prove
of the reliability of the information provided and
of the parties generating that information. Fin-
land is obliged to establish and maintain a nation-
al system, to implement its safeguards relevant
functions (SSAC functions) in a manner as to
enable the IAEA to carry out its verification activ-
ities efficiently. The IAEA is therefore requested to
express its interests and fit these to the repository
development time schedule.124.5 Availability of site
characterization data
Engineering geological site characterization was
carried out at the western end of the Olkiluoto
Island for over 30 years in order to demonstrate
the suitability of the site for the two NPP facilities
and their accompanying installations including
the underground storages for low and intermedi-
ate level waste. The site characterization, design
and construction were reviewed by local and na-
tional authorities. Moreover, the site characteriza-
tion for the final disposal facility was carried out
by the operating companies for more than 15 years
and this has also been reviewed by the national
authority, STUK. In addition, international review
groups are regularly consulted in the fields of en-
gineering-geological bedrock modelling, rock sta-
bility, hydrogeological and geochemical analysis.
The review groups have been supported by the
site characterization data collected by the opera-
tor or its subcontractors, presenting the qualified
national or international experts.
4.6 Proposed methods and technologies
The national authority started independent envi-
ronmental monitoring at the NPPs one year before
the operation of the first reactor. In Olkiluoto, the
progamme started in 1977 with radioecological
background studies being initiated as early as
1972. Continuous monitoring is carried out at the
distance of 0–10 km from the power plants.
The national experts group on the safeguards
for final disposal was founded in 2002. The group
possesses data on seismicity and satellite imagery
for national knowledge base on absence of unau-
thorized activities near the repository. Also, this
site characterization data can be used by interna-
tional review groups. The different environmental
monitoring, satellite imagery and geophysical
methods were discussed during the meeting.
4.7 Site-particular conditions affecting
IAEA monitoring
The Olkiluoto site is located in a crystalline bed
rock area where the soil cover is minimal. The
final disposal facilities are planned to be construct-
ed on the property of the operating company. The
company can provide access to the territory and
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 7assist in mounting any required monitoring in-
struments considered relevant for the safeguards
purposes. The excavation of the underground ex-
ploratory galleries will begin in 2004 and are
planned to continue for several years. The prepar-
atory works including removal of vegetation and
soil cover, and construction of supporting installa-
tions for electricity and ventilation accommoda-
tion near the entrance were initiated in 2003.
The pre-operational phase will begin with the
excavation of the non-nuclear gallery. The excava-
tion work will continue through out the construc-
tion phase until the end of the scheduled emplace-
ment operations after the required licensing. Dur-
ing the operation of the disposal facility, only
small parts of the disposal tunnels will be keptopen at a time. Tunnel construction and emplace-
ment activities are concurrent. It is planned, that
drilling for new emplacement tunnels will take
place in campaigns. During one drilling campaign,
which may last a year, tunnels for several years of
emplacement activities are excavated.
4.8 Follow-up procedure
The editing of the minutes was agreed to be car-
ried out by the participants during the autumn
2003. The final editorial work shall be undertaken
by the Finnish Support Programme. Finally, the
German delegation was asked to organise the next
meeting of the ASTOR Experts Group in Germany.
A visit to the Gorleben investigation mine, being
under moratorium, would be desirable.13
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ANNEX 1 EXPERTS’ GROUP MEETING AGENDAExperts’ group meeting in Rauma
29.9.–3.10.2003
Initial state characterisation of Olkiluoto site for
safeguards purposes: methods, techniques and
procedures
Venue: Hotel Cumulus, Rauma
Chair: To be selected
Drafting group: To be selected
Sunday, September 28
Arrival – STUK can help in organizing transports
from airport to Rauma
Monday, September 29
08:30 Bus leaves hotel Cumulus for transport to
Olkiluoto
09:00 Arrival at Olkiluoto
-presentation by Posiva and TVO
10:30 Guided tour to repository of medium and
low level waste (VLJ) and Posiva
investigation area
12:30 Lunch
13:30 Transport back to Hotel Cumulus, Rauma
14:30–16:00
Opening of the meeting, Chair, Juha
Rautjärvi
Welcome by IAEA, Alfredo
Diaz-Mosquera, IAEA
Introduction of participants and short
opening remarks, Participants
Introduction of the subject, Objectives of
the meeting, FINSP
Approval of the Agenda, Participants
16:00–16:20
– Coffee
16:20–18:00 Status Updates & Introductory
presentations
Status update by participating countries
concerning spent fuel disposal and backend safeguards – projects, plans and
research. Presentation + paper to be
included in the report, Participants
Technological implications of safeguards
requirements for geological repositories for
radioactive waste. S. Hossain, IAEA
The safeguards – safety interface
J. Rowat, IAEA
Possible features of safeguards measures
at final spent fuel disposal Y. Abushady,
IAEA
Tuesday, September 30
9:00–11:00 Introductory presentations
“Baseline”-conceptual definition and the
role of the concept in implementation of
safeguards (B.Moran & P.Button)
Information management and knowledge
creation (J. Rautjärvi, STUK)
11:00–11:20 Coffee
11:20 – 12:30 Baseline data and information
generation:
Posiva data generation and
management, information technology tools
(A. Ikonen, Posiva)
Satellite and airborne imagery for
Olkiluoto (T. Häme, VTT)
IAEA present practices and use of
satellite and airborne imagery (F. Claude,
IAEA)
12:30–14:00 Lunch Break
14:00–16:00 Baseline data generation session cont.
Spent fuel characterisation prior
encapsulation – Proposal for a good
practice applicable for Finnish conditions
(A.Tiitta, VTT)
Radiological monitoring and surveillance
program at Finnish power plant by STUK
(S. Klemola, STUK)15
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vinicity of Olkiluoto (M. Tarvainen,
Institute of Seismology)
3D Rock model for Olkiluoto as
a presentation tool (K. Jakobsson, STUK)
16:00–16:20  Coffee
16:20–17:50 Round table discussion (Workgroup
stimulation)
Satellite imagery application to Olkiluoto
case
Role of seismic techniques: safety and
safeguards
17:50–18:00 Dividing the participants into three
groups
Groups:
A) Olkiluoto site characterisation for safe-
guards purposes
B) Requirements for nuclear material
characterization for final disposal
C) Data and information requirements
for a knowledge based system.
Wednesday, October 1
09:00–13:00 Discussions in three working groups.
Preparation of draft document
13:00–14:00 Lunch Break
14:00–15:00 Guided walking tour through Old
Rauma1615:00–17:00 Discussions in three working groups.
Preparation of draft document
17:00–18:00 Experts Group future activities
Demonstration of electronic performance
support tool for group activities, discussion
Discussion of potential member state
support programme tasks necessary to
assist the IAEA in further developing and
testing the safeguards measures before
they must be implemented in a country.
Thursday, October 2
09:00–11:00 Plenary session, sharing the results
of the groups and identification of major
outcomes
11:00–11:20 Coffee
11:20–13:00 Finalization by the groups of the draft
documents
13:00–14:30 Lunch
14:30–16:00 Final plenary
Presentation and discussion.
Next meeting: objective, agenda,
a tentative host country and location.
Closing remarks.
Friday, October 3
09:00–12:00 Finalising the meeting document
(Drafting group).
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ANNEX 3 EXPERT GROUP ON APPLICATION OF
SAFEGUARDS IN GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORIES
Rauma, Finland
29 September to 3 October 2003
Report by Working Groups A & C1 Working group objectives
The objectives of working groups A and C were:
Working Group A – Olkiluoto Site
Characterisation for Safeguards Purposes and
Data and Information Requirements for a
Knowledge-based System
To determine the methods and tools for character-
ising the Olkiluoto region.
Working Group B – Requirements for Nuclear
Material Characterization
To determine the information required to charac-
terise the site and to populate a knowledge data-
base with safeguards relevant data.
The original intention was for three working
groups to be formed. However, after the initial
discussion and presentations it was decided to com-
bine the membership of working groups A and C.
2 Definition of baseline knowledge
The principal precursor of knowledge is data. Data
can exist in a number of forms and is derived from
many sources. In isolation, raw data may have
limited value as characteristics such as their prov-
enance and accuracy may not be defined. A certain
amount of supplemental, or contextual, data is
therefore necessary to support the raw data and to
give them a sense of value and timeliness. For
example, 4000MWd/teU is an item of raw data. In
its present form, it has little meaning or relevance
other than the fact that we can assume that it
refers to the burn-up of a fuel assembly. We do not
know if it is an integrated value, an average value,
if it has an accuracy of ±1000MWd/teU or
±10MWd/teU, or indeed, the identity of the fuel
assembly to which it relates. We therefore need to
add contextual data to give it meaning and rele-
vance. In summary, raw data with the addition of
relevant contextual data provides us with infor-
mation.18The information we now have concerning the
burn-up is of some use, but what is its relevance?
How might this data impact on a specific scenario
and what are the implications? If, by way of
example, we consider its safeguards impact we can
make a number of suppositions. For example, we
can infer that this fuel assembly is of relatively
low burn up and that it will contain plutonium. We
cannot say how much because we do not know the
characteristics of the fuel assembly, such as its
original enrichment or material composition. How-
ever, even with the limited information available
we can assume that any activity involving this
fuel assembly will have a safeguards implication.
It follows, therefore, that we will need to accurate-
ly determine the nuclear materials content and
record any movement of the assembly.
By establishing an association between the
information we have on the fuel assembly and our
implicit understanding of potential safeguards im-
plications we have made the transition between
data, information and knowledge. This knowledge
can then be used for the decision making process.
Whilst it is not the purpose of this paper to
provide a detailed examination of the creation of
knowledge it is worth noting that a final stage
exists and that is wisdom. Wisdom comes about
through developing an understanding of the sig-
nificance of knowledge and its subsequent applica-
tion.
For reasons which will be expanded upon later
in this paper, it is desirable to create a knowledge
database related to the disposal of spent fuel in a
deep geological repository. Spent fuel assemblies
destined for the future repository are discharged
on a regular basis and their unique data is contin-
uously created. The purpose of the knowledge base
is to help understand what safeguards relevant
data and, ultimately knowledge, is necessary to
safely manage the disposal of the spent fuel.
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This working group took generic information and
knowledge and applied it to the specific scenario of
the proposed development of a deep geological re-
pository in Finland for the final disposal of spent
fuel assemblies from its Olkiluoto and Loviisa
NPPs.
Posiva Oy is proposing to construct an under-
ground rock characterisation facility (URCF),
named ONKALO, on the island of Olkiluoto adja-
cent to the two BWR units. ONKALO is not a
nuclear facility but, subject to further investiga-
tion and the satisfactory outcome of tests and
support of the Finnish State, the URCF could
eventually become part of a larger, purpose built,
licensed repository.
In order to better understand the concept of
baseline information and identify sources of data
and information, it is assumed that ONKALO will
in time become an integral part of the final reposi-
tory. However, the outcome of this study could be
applied equally to any other site or facility.
This paper will make reference to “The Sys-
tem”. In this context, the system is assumed to
comprise four interrelating components: human
actions, the environment, the proposed facility
and institutional controls. Each component can be
considered in isolation but to obtain a full and
comprehensive picture it is necessary to under-
stand that two or more components will be inter-
acting at any one time. The nature of these inter-
actions is not necessarily defined but their signifi-
cance and impact are nonetheless relevant.
Human action around and in the repository
site is inevitable at all stages: pre-operation, oper-
ation, post-operation and post-closure. All human
actions must be considered including those direct-
ly related to the repository. Therefore the impact
of, inter alia, neighbouring industry, daily com-
muting, construction and recreational activities
will all impact on the system. Similarly, the envi-
ronment will determine to some extent the loca-
tion, layout, method of construction and lifetime of
the repository. The facility is clearly a fundamen-
tal part of the system and this will have an impact
on the environment and on human actions. The
fourth component, institutional control, will deter-
mine to a degree how the human actions will
impact on the facility operations and on the local
environmental conditions.4 Requirement for a baseline report
The working group next turned to discussing how
baseline knowledge should be collated and
communicated to stakeholders. It is suggested that
the most accessible form would be some type of
report that contained not only the data but some
interpretation of it.
It should be made clear that there is no inter-
national, regional or State regulatory requirement
to produce a Baseline Report. Consequently, there
must be a clear purpose for such a document. After
much discussion, the working group agreed that
there were a number of areas to which the Base-
line Report had the potential to contribute. These
included:
(a) Initial identification of safeguards
relevant aspects of the system
The Baseline Report could be used to identify and
further expand on the features of the system that
may impact on the safeguarding of the nuclear
material. In this way it could highlight design fea-
tures and provide a basis for discussions with the
safeguarding authorities.
(b) A record of the start conditions of the
system
Clearly, the Baseline Report should provide a
record of the ‘start state’ of the repository system;
in particular, the undisturbed geological, hydro-
logical and environmental features. In addition it
may describe the pattern of human activities in
the vicinity of the proposed site.
It was suggested that the Baseline Report
could be structured in such a way that it provides
start state information on the four aspects of the
system (human actions, the environment, the pro-
posed facility and institutional controls). Alterna-
tively it could be structured in three sections
examining above surface, near surface and deep
rock characteristics.
(c) Identification of weaknesses in the
system knowledge base
Not all information will be immediately available
and some sources of information will be less relia-
ble than others. The production of a Baseline Re-
port would encourage a ‘knowledge stock take’ to
be conducted. This would enable the operator to
direct future work or focus on particular aspects19
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the information.
(d) Identification of research & development
needs
An understanding and recognition of the unknown
is as important as stating the known. The Base-
line Report could be used to identify features or
characteristics where more data and information
are required and thus provide a key input into an
R&D plan. This is linked to the previous goal.
(e) Input into formal declarations to safeguards
authorities
At an early stage and some considerable time
before the first waste item is received, the State
will be required to inform the safeguards
authorities of its intent. It is preferable that
formal notification be preceded by discussions
between the two parties in order that a common
safeguards and complimentary approach is
adopted. The Baseline Report could be used as the
basis of these early discussions and as a key input
into the formal declaration.
4.1 Ownership of the repository
the baseline report
The baseline report will both contain and refer to
data, information and knowledge generated by a
wide range of sources. However, its compilation,
accuracy and comprehensiveness will be clearly
the responsibility of the organisation charged with
co-ordinating the system activities. In this specific
case it is suggested that the Baseline Report is
owned by STUK.
Ownership includes the responsibility for the
contents of the report, its control in terms of
distribution, its review and updating. The
management of the Baseline Report should be
made a specific responsibility of a team within
STUK. Collection and compilation of the data is
likely to be a complex and time consuming process
and one that will require the application of sound
project management principles. Changes to the
data or the information will have to be carefully
controlled and recorded.
4.2 Baseline report stakeholders
In Finland the principal stakeholders are The
State, the industry regulators (STUK), the devel-20opment company (Posiva) and the operators (TVO,
Fortum). In addition, the Finnish community will
have a stake in the report.
The IAEA and Euratom should be encouraged
to have a stake in the Baseline Report although it
should be made quite clear where ownership lies.
Much of the information contained in the report
will contribute to the development of the safe-
guards approach, and this needs to be reflected in
subsequent versions.
In the interests of popular support, openness
and transparency, the local community should be
encouraged to comment on the Baseline Report.
5 Baseline report evolution
The report provides a starting point for longer
term interactions between the stakeholders. It is
vital that there is a common understanding of this
start point. Baseline information is dynamic and
is expected to change as the project develops. It is
therefore necessary that the report owner employs
a robust system of change control to ensure that
subsequent versions of the report are properly ref-
erenced and that the changes are clearly docu-
mented.
There has been no attempt to define the end-
point at this stage. However, it is expected that the
baseline report will provide one of the key inputs
to subsequent declarations made to regulating
authorities and the safeguards inspectorate.
5.1 Means for data acquisition
The following sections provide an indication of the
range of technology that has been used to date to
acquire data on the site and the activities being
undertaken. Many of these technologies are well
established and there are examples of their use in
similar circumstances elsewhere. However, their
limitations are also well understood and there is a
need to improve certain aspects in order to pro-
vide more accurate or conclusive data. Where this
is the case, this section recognises the need for
further research and/or development.
This section examines the various data collec-
tion techniques either employed in the Olkiluoto
region or expected to be used to support future
site characterisation related to the ONKALO facil-
ity.
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5.1.1.1 General description
The technology of satellite imagery is well proven
and has been used by the military community for
many years. Its use has now spread to commercial
activities and is used on a daily basis for a wide
range of applications from crop analysis to miner-
al deposit identification. There are a number of
sensor systems available giving users the ability
to remotely observe earth based objects in all
weathers and conditions.
The increase in the use of satellite imagery has
resulted in several national programmes to con-
struct and launch satellites equipped with a wide
range of sensors and to subsequently make the
imagery available. Therefore, there are a number
of sources from which imagery can be obtained.
From 1991 onwards, the IAEA recognised the
potential of using commercially available satellite
imagery to support their safeguards activities. A
principal objective is to monitor the activities at
declared nuclear facilities. In order to study the
geological area, the resolution and imagery tech-
niques should be evaluated owing to the site-
specific targets.
5.1.1.2 Known limitations related to site
specific use
The spatial resolution of commercially available
optical satellite image data is presently limited to
0.58m (Nadir Quickbird PAN [initialise acronym])
and will be enhanced in the future. Since a spatial
resolution of 1m seems to be sufficient for most
purposes, the today’s high-resolution satellites
provide the relevant background information for a
general site characterisation – in cloud-free and
snow-free image acquisition times. In order to be
independent of the weather conditions limiting the
use of optical data, the improved SAR [initialise
acronym] image resolution would allow similar
levels of confidence.
5.1.1.3 Improvements identified and
development requirements
Due to technical improvements in the near future,
a better spatial resolution will be available, for
optical data as well as for thermal, hyperspectral
and radar imagery.Thus, a combination of satellite imagery show-
ing different spectral and spatial resolutions
would ensure an optimum basis. Particularly, an
improved spatial resolution of SAR images would
guarantee detailed information of the site and its
activities even in times of significant snow cover.
5.1.1.4 Safeguards-related objects to be
verified using satellite imagery
For evalution of the surface conditions, satellite
imagery (WGS84) and aerial imagery should be
provided to the Agency (the type and quality of
data will have to be discussed). Moreover, digital
maps and models should be delivered to the Agen-
cy for a detailed site description: A high-resolution
digital elevation model, digital maps and a digital
geological map. The data should be accompanied
by reports on the background of the data and their
potential use with regard to safeguards-related
tasks. In order to check, in particular, the limits of
optical data and to consider the specific weather
conditions at Olkiluoto, meteorological statistics
with information on monthly cloud cover, snow
cover and sun elevation should be taken into ac-
count as well.
Taking into account the improving spatial and
spectral resolution of satellite imagery and re-
garding the lack of extended research for the
monitoring of repository sites, R&D should focus
on image analysis, interpretion and visualization
techniques with respect to the usability for the
Olkiluoto site.
1. Radar imagery
For the use of radar (SAR) data, image analysis
techniques have to be investigated concerning
the improving spatial resolution. In order to
simulate the future spatial resolution, airborne
campaigns should be organized and carried
out. The potential and use of L-band data,
showing a better penetration because of a low-
er frequency, should be studied. Seasonal varia-
tions and impacts have also to be checked.
2. Hyperspectral data
The use of hyperspectral image data has to be
analysed in detail. An initial estimation will be
possible by the analysis of HYPERION image-
ry (NASA). To be prepared for the future devel-21
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sors, an airborne campaign should be carried
out with hyperspectral cameras. Moreover, a
field spectrometer campaign should be per-
formed, the field spectral measurements can
then result in a database of reference spectra
to be used for classification purposes.
3. Thermal data
Today, satellites like LANDSAT 7 (channel 6,
60m) and ASTER (channels 10–14, 90 m) pro-
vide thermal images data with a relatively low
resolution. For the very near future, innovative
improvements cannot be expected, but should
not be excluded. The potential of thermal data
may be determined by case studies based on
ASTER image data, more detailed with air-
borne thermal image data gathered during a
campaign over Olkiluoto.
Digital imagery has a high potential to the inter-
national safeguards of a repository. The Finnish
environmental conditions (winter, frequent cloud
cover) limit the use of the optical and thermal
data. They are, however, the principal information
source in earth observation domain for the base-
line. Radar (SAR) data applications should be de-
veloped to ensure all-weather capability in the in-
ternational safeguards. Airborne imagery should
be part of the baseline data but it is not used for
continuous monitoring purposes.
5.1.1.5 Recommendations for actions
1. Provide baseline information to the Agency
• STUK should provide the baseline data to
the Agency (copyright issues should be
examined)
• Satellite imagery (WGS84)
• Aerial imagery
• Digital elevation model of high resolu-
tion
• Digital base map
• Digital geological map
• Research reports
• Meteorological statistics (monthly
cloud cover, snow cover, sun elevation)222. Research for Olkiluoto repository site
• Radar (SAR) image analysis techniques
• concerning the improving spatial reso-
lution
• concerning L-band data (better pene-
tration to canopy than present instru-
ments due to lower frequency)
• concerning seasonal impact
• organization of airborne campaign to
simulate future satellite instruments
• Hyper-spectral data analysis techniques
• airborne campaign to simulate future
satellite instruments
• field spectrometer campaign to build a
reference spectra database
• Thermal data analysis techniques
• airborne campaign to simulate future
satellite instruments
• concerning seasonal impact
3. Involve IAEA member states’ support pro-
gramme
• Funding
• Equipment
• Expertise
• Human resources.
5.1.2 Environmental sampling
5.1.2.1 General description
The accumulation of environmental data over a
period of several decades may be of great assist-
ance in assessing the suitability of the land above
a repository for alternative land uses.
Parameters of potential relevance are:
• meteorology;
• hydrology, drainage, water usage, water quali-
ty;
• concentration of radionuclides and other pol-
lutants in various environmental compart-
ments including biota, sediments and waters;
• local ecology;
• geomorphological processes, such as denuda-
tion, localized erosion, slope evolution;
• tectonic activity such as vertical and lateral
earth movement rates, seismic events;
• geothermal heat flow;
• land use in the surrounding region.
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Use of earth observation techniques in the safeguards of a repository with a special reference to the Olkiluoto site.
Optical data, visible 
(panchromatic
Optical data 
(multi-spectral) Thermal IR Radar (SAR) Hyperspectral
Possible & potential Possible & potential Probably possible & 
potential must be 
shown
Possible in the near 
future & seems to 
have high potential
Probably possible & 
potential must be 
shown
Highest resolution 
possible (and 
affordable), 10 km 
radius from 
repository, principal 
data
Highest resolution 
possible (and 
affordable), 10 km 
radius from 
repository
May be of high 
potential but not yet 
known
(underground 
constructions vs. 
thermal response), 
resolution presently 
poor
Potential not yet 
clear, need high due 
to environmental 
conditions. 
Resolution 
presently 
approximately 10–
20 meters, will 
improve to 1–3 
meters by end of 
this decade. 
Possibly mineral 
detection of 
quarried rock
Visual analysis, 
possibly combined 
with multi-spectral 
data (in Finland of 
particular value 
because of 
vegetated/non-
vegetated surfaces)
Thematic 
classification?
Operative 
instruments?
First research 
priority
•  Intensity data
•  Interferometric 
data
•  Ground 
penetration
No operative 
instruments?
Application for 
visual classification
Application to 
thematic 
classification
Research on 
possibilities & 
potential
Research on 
possibilities & 
potential
Research on 
possibilities & 
potential
For every sensor type the specific application/information should be defined later (case study)5.1.2.2 Site specific use
Environmental monitoring has been carried out
on the Olkiluoto site for 30 years. In addition, sam-
pling has been carried out over a 10 km radius. To
date, the principal requirement for this wider sam-
pling has been to monitor the environmental im-
pact of the two BWR NPPs.
Historic information may be used to character-
ise the ONKALO site.
Changes in the baseline data may be deter-
mined through the analysis of these sample re-
sults.
5.1.2.3 Known limitations of related to site
specific use
The environmental information gathered to date
has been focused on demonstrating the impact of
the two BWR units on the Olkiluoto Island. Envi-
ronmental characterisation of the ONKALO site
may require a different series of samples to be
taken over a different area. It will also be impor-
tant to gather data throughout the entire year in
order to detect seasonal variations and fluctua-
tions.5.1.3 Radiological monitoring
5.1.3.1 General description
Radiological monitoring is a key tool that provides
assurance to authorities and the local community
that nuclear facilities are being safely operated. It
is a well understood technology with a large ex-
pert base. In broad terms, radiological monitoring
will be carried out remotely by installed devices or
other suitable means.
5.1.3.2 Site specific use
Any attempt at re-processing within the reposi-
tory will release both particulate and volatile radi-
onuclides. Particulate is likely to be contained by
HEPA filters, but detectable amounts of volatile
isotopes, such as 3H (as a gas or as tritiated water),
85Kr (gas) and 129I (as an iodide) could escape from
the hot cell and leave the repository in exhaust air
or in wastewater. Small quantities of volatile radi-
onuclides would also be released if a used fuel
canister were opened within the repository.
Naturally occurring radionuclides will be en-
countered, particularly in granite and clay; ele-23
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 7 ANNEX 3 EXPERT GROUP ON APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORIESments in the 238U and also 40K decay chains are
common. While analysis can clearly identify these
naturally occurring radionuclides, it would be wise
to establish a baseline. Radium-226 decays to
radon gas, an alpha emitter (half-life 3.825 days),
which is commonly encountered in mines, and also
at the present Olkiluoto underground facilities.
New excavation can lead to a significant release of
radon. Any radon anomaly would be associated
with new excavation possibly an illegal one. Typi-
cal radon levels and behaviour should be estab-
lished.
Observations of radionuclides in the air and
water should start as soon as possible during the
development of the facility. While high background
from natural and manmade radionuclides is not
expected, early observations will ensure that any
trends in background levels are well understood
and future anomalies can be addressed quickly.
Good knowledge of underground water movement
would help in identifying critical sampling points,
for this reason knowledge of hydrology is impor-
tant.
Environmental sampling for radionuclides will
likely be carried out to provide a baseline for
safety purposes. Reports on the analysis of water
and soil samples collected during the site selec-
tion/characterization phase should be provided as
baseline data. Since excavation will disturb the
ground water circulation, the baseline will need to
be updated during development.
Instrumentation for the detection of low levels
of 3H (as a gas or as tritiated water), 85Kr (gas) and
129I (as an iodide) in the exhaust air stream should
be identified or developed.
5.2.4 Geophysical monitoring
5.2.4.1 Passive seismic
Passive seismic monitoring is carried out at vari-
ous frequencies. Short period (0–50 Hz) seismic
monitoring is often carried out by national author-
ities to monitor natural seismicity. Micro-seismic
monitoring (1–100’s of Hz) is used to monitor rock
stress during intensive mining.
Micro-seismic monitoring is a likely method for
the detection of illegal excavation. If this capabili-
ty is required by the Agency, its suitability for the
proposed environment will need to be demonstrat-
ed.24Current passive monitoring includes the tem-
porary installation of short period seismometers.
For evaluation purposes three stations have been
installed on the surface and a fourth one is to be
installed shortly. Six others have been installed by
the Operator (Posiva). Raw data is logged at the
seismometer stations; there is no central logging
or source location. The objective is to gather data
on local noise patterns, which is known to include
noise from turbines and generators, wave noise
from the sea and breaking ice during the winter.
Spectral analysis is currently carried out on the
data. Future data of interest will be noise from
borehole coring and drilling during excavation. It
is believed that these signals can be selected by
using suitable filters.
The data currently being collected is useful, but
in the future we will need to focus on data needed
to demonstrate the effectiveness (or non-effective-
ness) of a system intended to detect drilling activi-
ty in progress. This may be more effectively car-
ried out using higher frequencies such as those
used by micro-seismic monitoring. It is recom-
mended that higher frequency seismometer equip-
ment be installed prior to the excavation of the
exploratory shaft/tunnel. The information collect-
ed on signal characteristics and attenuation in the
host rock would be invaluable in evaluating any
proposed future passive monitoring system.
In a further step, the source location capability
of such a monitoring system should be investigat-
ed, because this capability will be vital, if there is
a need to distinguish legal from illegal activities
during the operational phase. The use of seismic
arrays to determine the location of the seismic or
acoustic activity (with respect to direction, depth,
and distance) should also be evaluated as these
techniques will permit identification and tracking
of activities in the zones of interest.
5.2.4.2 Active seismic
Various active seismic methods could in theory be
used to image the sub-surface. It is the opinion of
the experts that this method would not be capable
of sufficient resolution at the depth being consid-
ered for the repository to be capable of detecting
undeclared tunnelling or cavities. It is of value in
determining geological details of the site to be de-
veloped and will be used by the operator for that
purpose. It will contribute to geological map of the
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general knowledge of the facility.
Reflection seismic surveying, which directly
produces profiles of the sub-surface is not an
effective technique due to the rocky and uneven
overburden, which provides poor acoustic cou-
pling. Vertical Seismic Profiling (VSP) is being
carried out using boreholes. This data is being
used to establish detailed geological knowledge of
proposed repository volume, which is of interest to
the Agency.
5.2.4.3 Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR)
Under favourable conditions, Ground Penetrating
Radar (GPR) will detect cavities within a short
distance of a rock face. The potential role for GPR
is in design information verification (DIV), in par-
ticular revealing undeclared cavities or tunnels.
(For this purpose, it is proposed that it should
have a demonstrated ability to detect a 2 metre
cubic void at 5 metres behind a rock face.) It
should be noted that GPR performance will de-
pend on the physical properties of the host rock
and the radar frequencies used.
GPR data collected during site evaluation and
construction (using boreholes and tunnels) could
be used both to show the potential for the detec-
tion of undeclared voids in different parts of the
future repository and to provide confidence that
no undeclared voids are in the vicinity. A GPR
baseline for the whole of the repository may not be
needed, since the reference is the declared reposi-
tory design.
Some GPR data has been collected from bore-
holes. This data is of value since it may be used to
demonstrate the performance of GPR in the host
rock. There will be particular interest in its per-
formance at repository depth. It is anticipated
that salinity of the rock will increase and perform-
ance/range of GPR will decrease. Opportunities to
make further determinations of the effectiveness
of GPR (for the detection of voids) should also be
exploited when the exploration tunnel has been
excavated. The data should be compiled in a report
to the IAEA.
5.2.4.4 Electromagnetic and electrical
There are a variety of methods for measuring the
electrical properties of the sub-surface. Electro-
magnetic and electrical methods may be used insite evaluation to determine conductivity at depth,
which in turn can be used to assist in the develop-
ment of a hydrological model for the repository.
Although electromagnetic/electrical techniques
could be used for detecting both non-conducting
areas such as tunnels and conductors such as rails
and electrical wires these techniques are not
thought to be practical for safeguards purposes.
Acquisition of electromagnetic or electrical data
for safeguards purposes alone is not requested. Its
contribution to the development of hydrology map-
ping is of value to the IAEA as a contribution to its
general knowledge of the site.
Passive electromagnetic techniques should be
evaluated to determine the capability to detect
signals from electromagnetic sources (e.g., motors,
electrical wiring, etc.) located at depths. However,
these methods will also be affected by the conduc-
tivity of the host geology.
5.2.4.5 Recommendations
Initial baseline from geophysical data:
Collection of passive seismic data should be
extended by micro-seismic data. Report submitted
should include a review of findings on noise sourc-
es, their characteristics and any information on
acoustic propagation in host rock.
Recommendations for evaluation of geological
conditions from geophysical data:
• Collection of passive seismic data should be
extended to include micro-seismic data. Report
submitted should include a review of findings on
noise sources, their characteristics and any in-
formation on acoustic propagation in host rock.
• Seismic arrays should be tested to determine
their ability to identify the location of a seismic
or acoustic source in the Olkiluoto environ-
ment. (These techniques have been tested in
the Yucca Mountain environment.)
• A geological map of the volume to be occupied
by the repository
• A hydrological map of the volume to be occu-
pied by the repository. Electrical conductivity
map if available.
• Report on GPR should include a review of
effective range particularly at the planned re-
pository depth.
• Studies on passive EM to determine ability to
detect EM signals generated from electrical
devices at repository depths.25
S T U K - Y TO - T R 2 0 7 ANNEX 3 EXPERT GROUP ON APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS IN GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORIES5.2.5 Hydrogeologic monitoring
5.2.5.1 General description
The geosphere surrounding a repository will re-
spond in a number of different ways to the pres-
ence of the repository, e.g. hydraulically, chemical-
ly. Relevant measurable parameters are tempera-
ture, groundwater chemistry, groundwater pres-
sure, solute chemistry and mineralogy. These pa-
rameters will often be measurable using boreholes
drilled during the site characterisation and under-
ground investigation phases. Many mineralogical
changes in response to repository ventilation are
likely to be confined to the immediate vicinity of
the repository.
Of particular interest are changes to the hy-
draulic and mechanical behaviour of rock struc-
tures that may have a direct bearing on the long-
term performance of the isolation system e.g. the
connectivity of major water conducting fractures.
Again, investigation of these features is likely to
be by boreholes drilled during the site characteri-
sation and underground investigation phases.
For repositories in the saturated zone, ground-
water flow will be towards the repository while
the repository remains open. However, following
repository resaturation (or perhaps resaturation
of part of the repository) groundwater will flow
through the repository back into the geosphere.
This will produce geochemical changes in the
geosphere. For some repository concepts e.g. those
that make extensive use of cement, the changes
may be profound.
Monitoring of these effects may be difficult, in
part because of problems of access to the affected
rocks, but mostly because the monitoring times-
cales are likely to extend into the post-closure
period. Nonetheless, these issues may be relevant,
both to model testing and to a societal decision to
close a repository.
5.2.5.2 Site specific use
Monitoring of local groundwater flow has been un-
dertaken by the operator.
5.2.6 Open source information
The term Open Source Information is used to de-
scribe information available from a wide range of26sources that has been published or is otherwise
available for access by the general public and com-
munity. At one extreme the open source informa-
tion can include technical reports produced by ex-
perts and made available through thesis, confer-
ence presentations or web-sites to telephone direc-
tories identifying local companies and their capa-
bilities.
Open source literature can be used to gain a
better understanding of the State or local commu-
nity technical expertise and competence.
5.3 The contents of the baseline
information report
5.3.1 Baseline report structure
This section provides some suggestions on the con-
tents of the Baseline Information Report. The re-
port should be structured and contain sufficient
detail to enable a reader with a reasonable under-
standing of the concept to gain an understanding
of the proposed facility, its impact on the environ-
ment and the interrelationships of the four compo-
nents of the system.
It is expected that the report will contain a
limited amount of data for the reasons expressed
above (in relation to the need to develop under-
standing in order to gain knowledge). However,
the report will reference out to the considerable
wealth of data and information that has been
gathered on the site and the proposed facility over
many years.
For convenience, the descriptive part of the
Baseline Report will be structured such that it
contains the following:
• Description of system component;
• Source and prominence of data;
• Limitations in the current knowledge;
• Planned enhancements to the current knowl-
edge base;
• Relationships to other system components;
• Identification of technical development;
• Safeguards relevance of the information.
The following section provides some suggestions
concerning the type of information to be provided
for each system component.
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• Centres of population
• Industrial activities
• Recreational activities
• Movement (i.e. commuting).
5.3.3 The environment
The report should provide a reasonably detailed
description of the proposed site in as much detail
as possible. It is unnecessary, however, for the re-
port to contain measurement or monitoring data
as much of this would require interpretation. It
may be advantageous to describe the surface of
the site, the near surface and sub-surface features.
Meteorological conditions (seasonal variations)
• Flora
• Fauna
• Rare breeds.
5.3.4 The proposed facility
• Purpose of the facility
• Method of construction
• Management and planning of construction ac-
tivities
• Testing and commissioning activities
• Ownership and operation of the facility
• Principal components of the facility (e.g. re-
ceipts railhead, verification facility, encapsula-
tion plant, transfer facility, repository)• Facility flowsheet
• Facility throughput
• Shift patterns
• Lifetimes
• Verification Methods
• Entity identification
• Emplacement philosophy
• Monitoring proposals
• Retrievability philosophy
• Closure proposals
• Extent and Detail of Project Plans
• Ownership and Location of Project Plans
• Project Plan Change Control
• Key Events and Timings.
5.3.5 Institutional controls
• Relevant laws
• Relevant treaties
• Regulations
• Organisational structures
• Roles and responsibilities
• Security measures.
5.3.6 System Component Relationships
Controls
Triggers
Monitoring of relationships.27
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ANNEX 4 REPORT OF THE MEASUREMENTS WORKING GROUPSAGOR II: WG on “Requirements for
Nuclear Material Characterization”
Composition of working group:
Tapani Honkamaa, STUK
Yousry Abushady, IAEA
John Rowat, IAEA
Käthe Sarparanta, TVO
Per H Grahn, SKB
Antero Tiitta, VTT
Spent fuel pins (not assemblies) are the target for
safeguards verification. IAEA current requirement
is verification at partial defect level. Such technol-
ogy does not still exist. “Advanced” methods, like
tomography, would permit verification even at the
pin level.
In the interim storage phase it is expected that
technical means to detect partial defects will be
developed. Present methods for verification –
CVDs and FORK – do not detect partial defects.
Advanced verification is also not performed, be-
cause such a possibility does not exist.
Nuclear materials characterization is a R&D
priority. Fifteen years may not be a lot of time to
develop and implement advanced characterization
methods. Some facility design decisions may de-
pend upon methods/processes used for nuclear
material characterization.
Posiva’s plans for operating the encapsulation
plant and the repository are based on “just-on-
time delivery” concept that is common in manufac-
turing industry. The Finnish concept for safe-
guarding the encapsulation process (Rautjärvi et
al., 2002) is adapted to this operational concept.
The concept requires that a buffer store area be
created for temporary storage of about 100 assem-
blies at interim storages. The efficiency of trans-
fers to encapsulation plant could be affected by28nuclear materials characterization process if veri-
fication decisions get delayed down at IAEA Head-
quarters. It was suggested that this could be
avoided if inspectors could make final verification
without having to defer to IAEA Headquarters, or
if alternative verification arrangements could be
developed. Any reverification after emplacement
of assemblies in copper casks is regarded as highly
undesirable. IAEA remarked that alternative pro-
cedures for verification will likely be in place in 15
years time.
Answers to major questions:
1) Why verify? Material going into final dispos-
al cannot be re-verified. Comprehensive verifica-
tion of the fuel assemblies on the partial defect
level has not been performed so far and this is the
last chance to do so.
2) What to verify? Spent fuel will be verified
with best possible method applicable. Pin level
verification is also possible. Partial defect meas-
urement is a requirement by the Agency criteria.
Such a method is not yet available.
3) When to verify? Verification should be made
as soon as characterization methods permit detec-
tion of partial defects. However, reverification
would likely be required at time of transfer to
encapsulation plant.
4) Where to verify? At the interim store (wet
store) – although a discussion of alternatives was
not undertaken.
5) How to verify? Best applicable method
should be used. The tomographic method de-
scribed at this meeting appears to be promising.
Further development of tomographic method is to
be encouraged. Also other methods should be de-
veloped. We should not bind ourselves into a
specific technology.
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Measurement technology should be developed. To-
mography seems to be a very promising method
for partial defects determination in spent fuel as-
semblies. Other NDA methods (e.g. enhanced
FORK detector) also need to be investigated to
perform similar partial defects measurements.
Current safeguards criteria require partial defect
verification of spent fuel assemblies before placing
them in difficult-to-access areas or no access areas
(as is the case for final disposal of spent fuel).
IAEA in collaboration with MSSPs is encouraged
to develop verification methods to the pin level.
The development objective is to find a method
where the equipment provides on-site analysis of
measurements to permit inspectors to draw con-
clusions without undue delays. Therefore, a meth-od should be found where the equipment provides
on-site analysis of fuel assemblies. With respect to
Finland, the measurement should permit flexible
and efficient management through facilitating
characterization of the spent fuel in the interim
wet store. The present characterization scheme in
Finland is in accord with this recommendation.
When partial defect detection equipment be-
comes available it is recommended that this equip-
ment be put into service immediately in interim
stores. It is recommended that the calorimetric
calibration for radiometric determination of decay
heat, deemed necessary for safety reasons, should
be accomplished shortly before the start of the
disposal activity as at that time the most reliable
calibration could be achieved.29
